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THE CRISIS OF VOLUME IN CALIFORNIA'S
APPELLATE COURTS:
A REACTION TO JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE
2020 AND A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE THE
NUMBER OF NONMERITORIOUS APPEALS*
Justice William F. Rylaarsdam**
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews and evaluates the recommendations pertain-
ing to the future of the appellate courts contained in the 1993 report
of the Commission on the Future of the California Courts' and a re-
port to the Commission prepared by Professor J. Clark Kelso.2 The
author believes that California's intermediate appellate courts face a
* This paper is based on a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the re-
quirements for the degree of LL.M. in the judicial process at the University of
Virginia School of Law. Portions of Parts II and III with 1995-96 figures ap-
pear in Hon. William F. Rylaarsdam, The Future of California's Appellate
Process: The 2020 Commission, CAL. LITIG., Spring/Summer 1998, at 4.
** Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate Dis-
trict, Division Three. University of California, Berkeley, B.S. 1957; Loyola
Law School, Los Angeles, J.D. cum laude 1964; University of Virginia, LL.M.
1998. The author serves on the California Judicial Council's Appellate Task
Force and Complex Litigation Task Force. He is also managing editor of Civil
Procedure Before Trial, a Rutter Group California Practice Guide, and a
member of the editorial board of California Litigation, a California State Bar
journal. The author has extensive teaching experience and has served on sev-
eral committees for the California State Bar. The author thanks Daniel J.
Meador, James Monroe Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Virginia, for
his assistance in the preparation of his thesis. The author also thanks Tsion
Chudnovsky for her capable assistance in editing this paper.
1. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE CALIFORNIA COURTS, JUSTICE IN
THE BALANCE 2020 (1993) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020].
2. J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 433 (1994).
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"crisis of volume," and both the Commission and Professor Kelso
have failed to recommend the type of drastic changes in appellate
procedure that are essential for these courts to continue to perform
their constitutional duties.
The author recommends that an alternative form of appellate re-
view be adopted which would permit the courts to resolve obviously
nonmeritorious criminal and juvenile appeals in a more summary
fashion, without the present requirements for oral argument and a full
written opinion in all such cases.3 The provisions of California Penal
Code section 1237.54 now require the trial judge to issue a "certifi-
cate of probable cause" before a criminal defendant may appeal from
a conviction following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.5 The
author believes these provisions should be amended to require such a
certificate before any criminal defendant or any party who suffers an
adverse judgment in juvenile court may appeal from a judgment or
postjudgment order. The trial judge should issue the certificate under
an "arguable issue on appeal" standard, while the appellate court
should review denied certificates by way of a petition for leave to ap-
peal, the denial of which would not require oral argument or a writ-
ten opinion. It is unclear at this time whether such a change would
require an amendment to the California Constitution.
I. THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
A. The Commission's Optimistic View of the Future
In 1993, after two years of study, a commission created by then
California Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas issued its report recom-
mending significant changes in dispute resolution for California liti-
gants, both in the courts and in private venues, over the next several
decades. 6 The Commission on the Future of the California Courts,
composed of a distinguished panel of business and labor leaders, law
enforcement representatives, lawyers, and trial and appellate judges,
entitled its report Justice in the Balance 2020.7 The report represents
3. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5 (West Supp. 1998).
5. See id.
6. See JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, supra note 1, at 40-53.
7. See id. at ii-iii.
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an extensive evaluation of both civil and criminal litigation processes
in California, and contains over 200 recommendations and strate-
gies.8 Specifically, the Commission suggests that these measures, if
adopted, will streamline and economize dispute resolution in future
years, while recognizing what Commission Chairman Robert R.
Dockson noted in his letter of transmittal as being the "issue that un-
derscores virtually every other area in the report, and that is the criti-
cal importance of justice."
9
Despite the merit of many of the Commission's recommenda-
tions, the section of the report dealing with the appellate courts l ° fails
to propose the more drastic changes that are essential to permit Cali-
fornia's intermediate appellate courts to continue to fulfill their func-
tions. Also, the report fails to recognize the "crisis of volume" which
is about to overwhelm the California appellate courts. This ap-
proaching crisis demands changes far more drastic than those sug-
gested by the Commission.
Justice in the Balance 2020 paints an unrealistically rosy picture
of California's appellate courts by the year 2020:
In 2020 new methods of dispute resolution and the
emergence of a truly multidimensional justice system have
had a significant impact on appellate justice. Because dis-
putants tend to be more directly involved in resolving their
disputes they tend to be more satisfied with the results and
thus less likely to appeal them. Appellate justice continues
to embrace the search for appropriate and effective alterna-
tive dispute resolution techniques.
Flexible process is the rule, not the exception, in 21st-
century appellate justice. In the waning years of the last
century, constitutional, statutory, and rule-based impedi-
ments to flexibility in the appellate process were eliminated.
Briefs, arguments, and written opinions are now seen and
heard only where genuinely needed. More effective com-
munication among the appellate and trial courts, the federal
bench, and the legislative and executive branches has
8. See id. at ii.
9.Id.
10. See id. at 163-172.
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created new harmonies in the drafting and interpretation of
the law.
Technological integration is a hallmark of multidimen-
sional justice. Appellate transcripts are on-line; motions
and briefs are submitted electronically; justices often hear
arguments via interactive video media; the Appellate Sys-
tem Network gives justices access to all public and private
materials...."11
Assuming all the predicted wonders of technology come about
-if not in the now rapidly waning days of the century, then in the
following decades-the Commission's recommendations fail to ad-
dress a basic problem which will persist: the inability of a relatively
fixed number of judicial and staff personnel to cope with ever-
increasing caseloads. Although technological innovations will help,
the fact remains that, whether on screen or on paper, records must
still be read, briefs studied, cases and statutes researched, and opin-
ions written. The limitations imposed by the human mind in accom-
plishing these tasks will limit the additional efficiencies technology
will bring to the appellate process.
The Commission predicts that in another twenty-five years,
"[b]riefs, arguments, and written opinions [will be] seen and heard
only where genuinely needed." 12 Yet, the Commission fails to tell us
on what basis it concluded that human nature and the culture of the
legal profession will suddenly change, parties become less litigious,
lawyers less motivated to file meritless appeals, and convicts less
persistent in seeking cost-free appellate relief, even in the face of
certain failure. Commenting on this Pollyanna-ish view of the future,
Professor Gerald F. Uelmen notes that the Commission's report pro-
poses
a severe outbreak of collective myopia in which the chief
ingredient for reform is more of the same ingredients. The
Commission envisions a future populated by really smart
judges and really cooperative lawyers, a world in which the
legislature has apparently been suspended and the initiative
11. Id. at 163.
12. Id.
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process abolished. In short, the future is a mythical place
where appellate litigation is declining because the law has
been "settled" and litigants are largely satisfied with the
justice meted out in the trial courts.
13
B. The Problem of Meritless Appeals
The limitation of "[b]riefs, arguments, and written opinions" to
those cases "where genuinely needed,"'14 as predicted by the Com-
mission, will not come about by merely wishing it. If we can devise
procedures to accomplish this salutary goal, significant efficiencies
are possible. As explained below, present procedures, which result
in all appeals being given "full dress treatment" by the California in-
termediate appellate courts, are the single most significant bar to ef-
ficiency.15 This "full dress treatment" results from the requirements
for oral argument and a full written opinion in Article VI, Section 14
of the California Constitution, as interpreted by the California Su-
preme Court. 16 Even if appeal as a matter of right were retained, de-
letion of the requirements for oral argument and full written opinions
would permit the California appellate courts to manage cases on a
differential basis, similar to the method now practiced in the federal
appellate courts.
17
Rules permitting early screening of nonmeritorious appeals, par-
ticularly in the area of criminal and juvenile law, may reduce appel-
late workloads by as much as 50%. I" If implemented, such rules
13. Gerald F. Uelmen, Creating an Appetite for Appellate Reform in
California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 598 (1994).
14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 34(a); 9TH CR. R. 36-1.
18. See Robert Ablon, 'Routine' Case Sparks Change in Law and 3rd Dis-
trict Rules, THE RECORDER, June 10, 1997, at 1. When inquiring whether
counsel wishes to have an oral argument, the Third District classifies cases as
"routine" when it has reviewed the briefs and concluded that affirmance in an
unpublished opinion (i.e., one which merely restates existing law) is indicated.
See id. The article quotes Justice Puglia, the district's presiding justice, as in-
dicating that 80% of criminal appeals and 15% of civil appeals fall into this
category. See id. at 4. Since over 60% of all appeals are in criminal proceed-
ings, see infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text, the courts' ability to resolve
80% of these cases in a more summary fashion would have a dramatic impact
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would permit the California Courts of Appeal to operate efficiently
and expeditiously for many years to come, with little or no increase
in personnel. Such a change would require the abolition of "full
dress" appeal as a matter of right in these cases.
Procedures can be devised to eliminate the current requirement
that appellate courts engage in the kind of "make-work" involved in
processing obviously nonmeritorious appeals, while preserving all
constitutional protections to which litigants are entitled. Only the
adoption of such procedures will have a significant impact on appel-
late workloads. It is therefore unfortunate that the Commission
concluded "[t]he appeal as of right should be retained." 19 The appeal
"as of right" cannot be justified where a high percentage of appeals
are, if not frivolous, obviously without merit.
As the problem of meritless appeals is particularly grave in the
area of criminal and juvenile appeals, the procedural changes rec-
ommended here address only those cases. This is not to suggest all
civil appeals are meritorious. However, because civil litigants bear
the cost of their appeals, economic restraints make the problem of
obviously nonmeritorious appeals in civil cases far less significant.
Civil litigants tend to be more careful in selecting cases to appeal, as
illustrated by the ratio between superior court judgments and appeals
in civil as compared to criminal cases. For example, in 1996-97,
there were 20,541 general civil dispositions after trial in California
superior courts, and 7,963 notices of appeal in such cases. During
the same period, there were 7,258 criminal dispositions after trial in
superior courts,22 and 8,818 notices of appeal in criminal cases.23
on the courts' workload.
19. JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, supra note 1, at 171.
20. See 1 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE COURTS, 1998 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, at 47 tbl.6 col.(D) (1998)
[hereinafter 1998 COURT STATISTICS REPORT].
21. See id. at 107 tbl.2.
22. See id. at 52 tbl.9 col.(C).
23. See id. at 107 tbl.2. The excess of appeals over dispositions after trial
results from appeals that may be filed from postjudgment orders. For example,
a criminal defendant who pleads guilty may appeal from the sentence imposed.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1237, 1466(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998). In addition, a
defendant who pleads guilty may appeal from an earlier denial of a motion to
suppress evidence. See id. § 1538.5(m). Likewise, appeals in civil cases may
be from postjudgment orders, such as orders awarding costs or attorneys' fees,
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Although both civil and criminal appeals include some appeals from
orders other than judgments after trial, civil appeals represent 39% of
dispositions after trial, compared to 121% for criminal appeals. Yet
this is probably not the whole story; litigants settle or otherwise
abandon a significant percentage of civil appeals before the record is
even prepared, while there is generally no basis for such settlement
or abandonment in criminal appeals.
III. THE "CRISIS OF VOLUME"
The Commission's report notes that "[iun 1991-92, the 88 jus-
tices of the Court of Appeal were faced with 21,628 new contested
matters (246 per justice), an increase of 20 percent per justice-37
percent system-wide--over 10 years earlier. Projecting future dock-
ets on a straight-line basis, the Court of Appeal will, by 2020, see
40,617 filings per year."24 The Commission predicts, however, that
by the year 2020, "[m]any or most disputes will be resolved through
mediation or other forms of assisted negotiation, early neutral
evaluation, and other consensual processes from which there is no
right of appeal, 25 and therefore "the appellate court dockets of 2020
may be significantly more manageable than those of 1993. "26
Whether this optimistic forecast is reasonable for civil cases is be-
yond the scope of this paper. Alternative dispute resolution is grow-
ing; civil filings in superior courts have been decreasing;27 and, since
we may presume a rather direct correlation between civil filings in
superior courts and appeals to intermediate appellate courts, it may
not be unreasonable to assume civil appeals will decrease unless
there is a change in this trend.
or may be from judgments entered without trial, such as orders of dismissal or
summary judgments.
24. JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, supra note 1, at 164.
25. Id. at 165.
26. Id.
27. General civil filings in California Superior Courts declined from
258,934 during 1986-87 to 186,423 during 1996-97, representing a 23% re-
duction in civil filings. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA,
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, at 109 tbl.5
col.(B) [hereinafter 1998 ANNUAL REPORT]; 1998 COURT STATISTICS REPORT,
supra note 20, at 45 tbl.5 col.(B).
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Still, this assumed correlation is not a given. The author is not
aware of studies that disclose the types of cases being diverted to al-
ternative dispute resolution, as compared to those which continue to
be filed in superior courts. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests
that the bulk of cases presently resolved through arbitration and other
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are the smaller cases. It is
not unreasonable to assume that such cases, where the parties have
less money at stake, would be less likely to be appealed. Also, al-
though there has been a significant decrease in civil filings in Cali-
fornia superior courts, the number of trials has actually increased.
During 1986-87 there were 3,022 civil jury trials in California supe-
rior courts,28 while there were 3,351 during 1996-97,9 an
increase of 10%. After-trial dispositions of all "general civil" cases
decreased by 8% during the same period, from 22,14730 to 20,541. 3'
The decrease in civil filings is unlikely to result in a significant de-
cline in civil appeals, at least in the short run, because a significant
proportion of appeals are presumably from judgments after trial. In
addition, appellate courts have seen a substantial increase in appeals,
at least anecdotally, after the grant of summary judgment.
Well over 60% of all appeals are in criminal or juvenile cases 32
and nearly all of these appeals involve felonies.33 Hence, the avail-
ability of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, which the
Commission predicts would take these cases out of the court system,
is extremely limited.34 It is therefore unreasonable to project a
28. See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 112 tbl.7 cols.(C), (G).
29. See 1998 COURT STATIsTIcs REPORT, supra note 20, at 48 tbl.7
cols.(C), (G).
30. See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 111 tbl.6 col.(D).
31. See 1998 COURT STATISTIcs REPORT, supra note 20, at 47 tbl.6 col.(D).
32. In 1996-97, a total of 16,881 records were filed in California's interme-
diate appellate courts. Of these, 10,494 were criminal and juvenile cases. See
1998 COURT STATIsTIcs REPORT, supra note 20, at 24 tbl.4 cols.(B), (D), (E).
33. In California, infractions and misdemeanors are prosecuted in the mu-
nicipal courts. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1462 (West Supp. 1998). Appeals
from misdemeanor convictions are addressed to the appellate departments of
the superior courts. See id. § 1466. However, where a defendant is charged
with a felony but is subsequently only convicted of a misdemeanor, an appeal
is made to a court of appeal. See id. § 1235 (West 1982).
34. The Commission does suggest alternatives that would reduce criminal
prosecutions: "selective decriminalization of nonviolent property offenses;
[ ol. 32:63
November 1998] ' CRISIS INAPPELLATE COURTS
decrease in criminal appeals, absent major structural changes. In
1986-87, there were 5,093 criminal appeals in California.31 In 1996-
97 there were 8,610 such appeals,36 an increase of 69%. Assuming a
similar increase over the succeeding decade, California's appellate
courts would be faced with over 13,000 criminal appeals in 2007.
This is not the first time California's appellate courts have con-
fronted a crisis of inadequate resources in the face of a rapidly
increasing caseload. In 1981, the California Assembly Judiciary and
Criminal Justice Committees conducted hearings to consider changes
in appellate processes to confront the increasing backlogs in appel-
late resolutions.37  At that time, the legislators already perceived
criminal appeals to be the primary problem.38 They made and dis-
cussed a number of proposals for changes in criminal appellate pro-
cedure, some of which are addressed below; none of these proposals
were adopted. Instead, the legislature created eighteen additional ap-
pellate judgeships, a 23% increase in the appellate judiciary, and sub-
sequently provided an appellate court budget that permitted an in-
crease in staff attorneys to assist the judiciary. 39 Since that time, the
legislature has made additional small increases in the appellate judi-
ciary and has continued to increase the ratio between appellate judges
and staff attorneys.40  However, these increases in appellate
greater use of diversion programs; and community-based criminal justice."
JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, supra note 1, at 145. However, recent trends
tend towards criminalization rather than decriminalization, see id. at 146-47;
diversion programs are of limited use when dealing with felonies; and "com-
munity-based criminal justice" is more likely applicable to misdemeanors than
to felonies.
35. See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 89 tbl.5 col.(E). The fig-
ures presented here and in the succeeding footnote reflect contested superior
court dispositions concerning criminal records on appeal filed.
36. See 1998 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 20, at 24 tbl.4 col.(D).
37. See Court of Appeal Efficiency: Hearing Before the Assembly Judici-
ary and Criminal Justice Comms., Assembly doc. 1981, no. 945 (Cal. 1981)
[hereinafter Court of Appeal Efficiency].
38. See id. at 9-10, 27-29, 33-36, 42-44, 45-48, 50-59, 60-67, 80-81, 90-
116.
39. See Act of Sept. 29, 1981, ch. 959, 1981 Cal. Stat. 3643.
40. In 1989-90, there were 2.93 staff attorneys per justice; by 1996-97, the
number of staff attorneys per justice had increased to 3.28. See Memorandum
from the Administrative Office of the Courts (March 18, 1998) (on file with
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Administrative Office
Memorandum].
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personnel have failed to keep pace with the increase in the appellate
caseload.4 1
Continued increases in appellate court personnel are neither de-
sirable nor politically feasible.42 Alterations in the procedures by
which the appellate courts consider and decide criminal and juvenile
appeals can and should be made. After discussing the limitations
which presently prevent the courts of appeal from adopting more ef-
ficient procedures, the remainder of this paper will discuss and
evaluate an alternative procedure to enable appellate courts to handle
a larger volume of criminal and juvenile cases without impairing the
fairness of the process.
IV. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES
Professor J. Clark Kelso prepared a report, which was subse-
quently published, for the Commission on the Future of the Califor-
nia Courts.43 This report appears to form the basis for the Commis-
sion's recommendations pertaining to appellate courts. The report
discusses and evaluates most of the procedures that have periodically
been suggested to deal with increasing appellate workloads. Profes-
sor Kelso discusses suggestions for the intermediate appellate courts
under the following headings:
(1) Increase the Number of Appellate Justices or Staff or
Both;"4
(2) Decrease the Number of Appeals;
45
a. Providing Economic Deterrents to Appeal; 46
b. Increasing the Number of Discretionary Appeals,
47
c. Increasing the Use of the Superior Court Appellate
Department;
48
d. Reducing the Need for Appeals;49
41. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
43. See Kelso, supra note 2.
44. Id. at 442-43.
45. Id. at 443.
46. Id. at 443-45.
47. Id. at 445-47.
48. Id. at 447.
49. Id. at 447-50.
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In addition, Professor Kelso makes a number of excellent sug-
gestions regarding the appellate process itself, which are beyond the
scope of this paper.50 The remainder of this paper will evaluate Pro-
fessor Kelso's recommendations under each of the above-noted
headings. The author agrees with much of what Professor Kelso
states, but disagrees particularly with his evaluation of the desirabil-
ity of providing for discretionary appeals in certain criminal and ju-
venile cases.
A. Increasing the Number ofAppellate Justices or Staff or Both
1. Increasing the number of justices
Professor Kelso notes that the number of majority opinions each
appellate court justice authored averaged 127 in 1991-92.51 During
the most recently reported fiscal year, 1996-97, this average rose to
148.52 Professor Kelso quotes Professors Carrington, Meador, and
Rosenberg, who advise that "[i]n the absence of special circum-
stance, no state appellate court operating at the first level of review
should be asked or permitted to make more than 100 dispositions on
the merits per judgeship per year."5 3 A panel of three justices de-
cides each case. Therefore, under the Carrington, Meador, Rosen-
berg standard, each appellate justice would be responsible for the
resolution on the merits of some 300 cases per year. Based on actual
figures in California for 1996-97, this number presently averages al-
most 450 cases per justice;5 4 because this is an average, many appel-
late justices actually carry even heavier caseloads. For example, in
50. They include suggestions for greater efficiency in the following areas:
preparation of the record for appeal, preparation and filing of adversary briefs,
determination as to whether the appeal qualifies for special treatment, argu-
ment before the panel of judges, application of an appropriate standard of ap-
pellate review, and communication of the court's opinion to the public. See id.
at 457-86.
51. See id. at 441.
52. See 1998 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 20, at 16 fig.3.
53. Kelso, supra note 2, at 441 (quoting PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL.,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 230 (West ed., 1976)).
54. This figure is based on 13,355 written opinions and 88 justices. See
1998 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 20, at 110 tbl.5; Administrative
Office Memorandum, supra note 40.
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the author's division, the third division of District IV, five justices
issued 852 opinions in 1996-97, 55 over 170 each. This means that,
on average, each justice in this division was responsible for over 500
opinions.
Using a standard of 105 opinions per justice per year, Professor
Kelso projected that, absent changes in the appellate process, 125
justices would have been needed by 1995 and 200 additional appel-
late judgeships by the year 2020.56 Thus, based on Professor Kelso's
projections, the Califormia Court of Appeal, if adequately staffed and
absent procedural changes, should have more than 300 justices by
2020. Even maintaining the present average of 148 opinions per jus-
tice would require at least a doubling of the appellate judiciary over
the next twenty-five years.
An increase in appellate judgeships to keep pace with increasing
workloads is not likely to be politically feasible. As early as October
1981, the California Assembly's Judiciary and Criminal Justice
Committees recognized that the legislature must consider methods
other than a continuous increase in appellate judicial positions to deal
with ever-increasing appellate caseloads. 57 In 1995-96, total expen-
diture for the California Court of Appeal-then consisting of eighty-
eight justices and their staffs-was over $73 million, excluding funds
courts paid to counsel appointed to represent indigent criminal de-
fendants. 58 Disregarding inflation, an increase to 200 justices would
raise the cost to nearly $200 million. Allowing for only a modest in-
flation of 2% per year, this figure rises to almost $250 million, or
$330 million if the cost of counsel appointed to represent indigents is
included. Using Professor Kelso's estimate of the need for 300 ap-
pellate justices,5 9 these figures rise to $375 million and almost $500
million, respectively.
The California legislature is not likely to increase appellate court
budgets to this extent. Experience teaches that, even where the num-
ber of positions was increased from time to time, such increases were
always in response to an already developed crisis of backlogs and
55. See 1998 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 20, at 110 tbl.5.
56. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 442.
57. See Court ofAppeal Efficiency, supra note 37, at 6.
58. See Administrative Office Memorandum, supra note 40.
59. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 442.
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rarely adequate to respond to the actual increase in workload. Courts
are subject to the "less government" philosophy, which now affects
our public institutions at all levels to the same extent as all other
arms of government.
Aside from the political realities, an ever-expanding intermedi-
ate appellate court is not desirable from a policy standpoint. In the
process of deciding cases, the court performs another equally impor-
tant function: it shapes the law. In doing so, the court should devise
clear rules that not only guide the trial courts but also teach prospec-
tive litigants what their rights and duties are, thus limiting the need
for litigation in the first place. Uncertainty in the law feeds the need
for litigation and appeals. As California's intermediate appellate
court has grown in size, its rule-setting function has weakened.
Criticism is already mounting that the court is turning into a babble
of voices failing to provide clear guidance to trial courts and liti-
gants.
60
Although stare decisis compels California trial and intermediate
appellate courts to follow the decisions of the California Supreme
Court,61 the decision of one court of appeal panel is not binding on
another panel. This is true whether the panel resides in the same ap-
pellate district or another, or even in the same division.62 In the face
of conflicting court of appeal decisions, a trial court is free to choose
which precedent to follow, even if one of the conflicting decisions
originated in an appellate district other than the one where the trial
court sits.63 A rule requiring court of appeal panels to follow the de-
cisions of other panels is not necessarily desirable, as this would tend
60. See, e.g., Kelso, supra note 2, at 490-92; William M. Richman & Wil-
liam L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for
the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273, 297-334 (1996).
61. See, e.g., People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 734, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 539, 542 (1986); Orange County Water Dist. v. City of Riverside, 173
Cal. App. 2d 137, 165-66, 343 P.2d 450, 465 (1959).
62. See, e.g., McCallum v. McCallum, 190 Cal. App. 3d 308, 315 n.4, 235
Cal. Rptr. 396, 400 n.4 (1987); Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City
of Los Angeles, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1147, 209 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (1985).
63. See McCallum, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 315 n.4, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 400 n.4.
When a novel issue first arises, it frequently and desirably results in a "debate"
between several panels before a final resolution is reached. Such a "debate"
between the different panels tends to improve the quality of the ultimate reso-
lution of the issue.
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to create a rush to judgment when novel issues arise. 64 Whether de-
sirable or not, if there is a further increase in the appellate judiciary,
the present state of California law pertaining to stare decisis will
necessarily result in an increased uncertainty in the law. Such un-
certainty not only increases the demand for the courts' services but
also reflects negatively on the public's perception of judicial legiti-
macy.
2. Increasing the number of staff attorneys
Professor Kelso recommends increasing the number of staff at-
torneys assigned to the court of appeal.65 The Commission adopted
this recommendation: "[b]efore increasing the number of Court of
Appeal justices, the Legislature should increase the court's staff re-
sources." 66 As of 1996, there were 289 staff attorneys assisting 88
.justices in the California Court of Appeal67 or 3.3 attorneys per jus-
tice. Typically, two or three attorneys work directly with the justice;
others work as "central staff' and as "writ attorneys." Those em-
ployed in the latter capacities review and make recommendations
pertaining to petitions for extraordinary writs. In some divisions,
they also perform a screening function and draft opinions in what are
determined to be "routine" cases. Whether attorneys work under the
immediate supervision of the justice to whom they are assigned or as
"central staff," the justices of the court issue all its decisions. Thus,
the three justices who ultimately issue the opinion remain responsible
for the product. In order to carry out their responsibilities, the jus-
tices must devote time to each opinion to check the record, briefs, re-
search, and conclusions drawn, and to edit the final product.
Under a system in which a single justice may be responsible for
as many as 500 opinions per year, staff attorneys obviously must per-
form almost all of the original work. Most judicial time is spent re-
viewing staff attorneys' work. However, the present system at least
allows justices some time to do the original work on cases they con-
sider of particular significance. Increasing the number of staff
64. Perhaps such a rule could work if combined with a provision for some
form of en banc review at the court of appeal level.
65. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 443.
66. JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, supra note 1, at 169.
67. See Administrative Office Memorandum, supra note 40.
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attorneys per justice would necessarily decrease judicial participation
in the very process required of them. Although an increase in staff
assistance to the appellate judiciary may be necessary and inevitable,
there is substantial literature critical of this development in appellate
jurisprudence and the resulting "ghostwriting" of opinions by
anonymous bureaucracies.
68
B. Decrease the Number of Appeals
Absent changes in appellate procedure to increase appellate
court productivity, the only alternative to expanding the number of
appellate justices, staff attorneys, or both, is to devise strategies to
reduce the number of appeals. In this regard, Professor Kelso dis-
cusses four proposals: (1) providing economic deterrents to appeal;
(2) making more appeals discretionary; (3) reassigning some appeals
to the superior courts' appellate departments; and (4) reducing the
likelihood of trial court error, thereby reducing the need for ap-
peals.
69
1. Economic deterrents to appeals
There exist built-in economic deterrents to meritless civil ap-
peals. Litigants bear the costs associated with such appeals, and gen-
erally a well-informed litigant will avoid incurring such costs to pur-
sue a meritless appeal. As an additional economic deterrent to
meritless appeals, the legislature should consider adopting the British
system, whereby the losing party pays the winner's attorneys' fees.
70
Professor Kelso suggests that, as a further disincentive, the legisla-
ture might consider a rule requiring the losing party to reimburse the
court for its costs.71 An evaluation of these suggestions, all of which
appear to have merit, is beyond the scope of this paper.
The situation pertaining to economic disincentives is very dif-
ferent with respect to criminal appeals. Because most criminal de-
fendants are indigent, the state pays their attorneys' fees. 72 There is
68. See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 60, at 287-88.
69. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 443-50.
70. See Charles W. Branham III, Note, It Couldn't Happen Here: The
English Rule-But Not in South Carolina, 49 S.C.L. REV. 971, 973-75 (1998).
71. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 444.
72. In 1996-97, California appellate courts were budgeted over $44 million
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no economic disincentive to the pursuit of a criminal appeal, no
matter how unlikely its success. The ratios between appeals and
judgments after trial in criminal cases (121:100),73 and in civil cases
(39:100)74 well illustrate this difference in economic incentives. A
further indication is the fact that only 6% of criminal appeals result in
reversals, while 25% of civil appeals are resolved in favor of the ap-
pellant.75 As noted in Justice in the Balance 2020:
[t]he absence of any economic disincentive to appeal, com-
bined with the incentive of avoiding a criminal conviction,
results in a high rate of appeal, notwithstanding a low rever-
sal rate. An economic penalty levied against either ap-
pointed counsel or the indigent appellant for filing a good
faith but losing criminal appeal is both impractical and
probably unconstitutional.76
There have been proposals to provide disincentives to criminal
appeals. Under British law, a now-abolished procedure empowered
the appellate court to increase the sentence of a criminal appellant
upon a finding that the appeal lacked merit.77 However, such a rule
probably would not satisfy the due process requirements of the
United States and California constitutions. 78 During the previously
discussed 1981 assembly committees hearing, one sanction suggested
for the filing of a non-meritorious appeal was a reduction in the
amount of time credited to a convicted defendant for "good behav-
ior.",79 Again, this raises constitutional issues beyond the scope of
this paper. At the same hearing, Professor Myron Moskovitz pre-
sented a proposal-first made by Professors Carrington, Meador, and
Rosenberg-that all convicted felons be given a sum of money which
to pay counsel to represent indigent criminal defendants. See JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, 1998
ANNUAL REPORT II, at 62 (1998).
73. See supra Part II.B.
74. See supra Part II.B.
75. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 445 (citing information for 1991-92).
76. JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, supra note 1, at 170.
77. See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals:
The Threat to the Function ofReview and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV.
542, 579 (1969).
78. "It is probably constitutionally impossible to deter appeals by providing
effective punishment for those who abuse the process." Id. at 574.
79. See Court ofAppeal Efficiency, supra note 37, at 42.
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they could use either to help pay for their appeal or for personal ex-
penditures. 80 Considering all of the expenses associated with crimi-
nal appeals, he estimated that a payment of $200 to each convicted
felon for this purpose would save the state some $4 million annually
if criminal appeals were reduced by 20%.81 He estimated that a 50%
reduction would result in saving more than $12 million annually.
82
These are 1980 figures and perhaps a $200 payment would now have
a less significant impact on criminal appeals. However, at today's
costs, a payment of $500 or even $1,000 per convicted felon would
likely have a significant impact on the number of criminal appeals
filed and result in substantial savings. The problem with this eco-
nomically sound proposal is entirely political. The legislators con-
sidering Professor Moskovitz' proposal were unanimous in noting
that the idea of giving a convicted felon a "bounty," in the words of
Assemblyman Richard Robinson, would "result [in a situation
where] those individuals that were stupid enough to vote for the bill
would not be around to vote for the next reapportionment plan."
83
2. Diverting appeals to the superior court
Professor Kelso also suggests that "[d]iverting select court of
appeal cases to the superior court appellate department stands out as
one of the most likely responses to increasing court of appeal
caseloads." 84 The Commission which prepared the 2020 report did
not accept this proposal. Its weakness is illustrated by Professor
Kelso's recognition that, although such a strategy would lessen the
caseload in the appellate courts, "[s]imply transferring appeals from
the court of appeal to another tribunal would effect no net savings-
and would thus be unjustifiable-unless the other tribunal could han-
dle the cases more speedily or accurately. 8 5 Professor Kelso also
notes that, "the appellate department of a superior court, which is
80. See id. at 53-59, 107-11. Professor Moskovitz noted that this scheme
was originally proposed in PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL
91-95 (West ed., 1976). Under this proposal, the defendant, by accepting the
money, would forever waive the right to appeal or seek post-conviction relief.
81. See Court ofAppeal Efficiency, supra note 37, at 109.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 56.
84. Kelso, supra note 2, at 447.
85. Id.
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staffed by trial judges who might have direct access to the trial
court's file, could handle appeals more speedily and accurately when
the issues are limited to questions of trial procedure under estab-
lished law, repetitive application of certain statutes, or exercise of
trial court discretion. '' 86 However, access to trial court files is not a
significant problem for appellate courts.
The proposal to have certain appeals handled by the appellate
department of the superior court merits further consideration. The
constitutional requirement for written opinions, which creates most
of the appellate workload, does not apply in appeals from the mu-
nicipal courts to the appellate department of the superior court.87 If
the California Constitution permitted the appellate departments of the
superior courts to handle appeals resulting from certain convictions
in the superior court, the appellate system could obtain significant ef-
ficiencies. 88 At a minimum, cases that are filed as felonies in supe-
rior courts but result in misdemeanor dispositions and civil judg-
ments in amounts within the jurisdiction of the municipal court
would seem to be ideal candidates for such a change.89 If, however,
as suggested below, strategies can be adopted to permit appellate
courts to likewise resolve certain criminal and juvenile cases without
written opinions, little by way of efficiencies will result from the
mere transfer of the workload to another segment of the California
judiciary.
86. Id.
87. "Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine
causes shall be in writing with reasons stated." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
The rules pertaining to decisions of the appellate departments of the superior
courts do not contain a similar provision: "The judges of the appellate depart-
ment shall not be required to write opinions in any cases decided by them, but
may do so whenever they deem it advisable or in the public interest." CAL.
CT. R. 106.
88. Such a change may require an amendment to the California Constitu-
tion. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (stating "[C]ourts of appeal have appellate
jurisdiction when superior courts have original jurisdiction").
89. Since few appellate judiciary department opinions are published, the
"Tower of Babel" effect resulting from an increase in the appellate system
would be minimized. See supra Part IV.A. Also, to the extent an increase in
the judiciary would be required, adding trial court judges may be more politi-
cally feasible than increasing the number of justices on the California appellate
courts.
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3. Reduced trial error
Professor Kelso also suggests that "[t]he best way to lighten the
appellate caseload is to reduce the need for and number of trials and
diminish errors committed in those trials." 90 As to criminal trials, as
previously noted, it is unlikely their number will diminish.91 The
remainder of the quoted sentence suggests that trial error drives ap-
peals. 92 This is not true for criminal appeals; if it were, the reversal
rate would far exceed the 6% previously noted.93  The convicted
felon who has no disincentive to file an appeal will file one in nearly
all cases, regardless of trial error.
4. Discretionary appeals
We are thus left with the final strategy discussed by Professor
Kelso: increasing the proportion of appeals subject to discretionary
review.94 However, both Professor Kelso and the Commission re-
jected this suggestion.95 The Commission notes: "The appeal as of
right should be retained. 96 In the author's opinion, California's ap-
pellate system cannot afford the luxury of retaining appeals as a
matter of right in all instances. The Legislature should consider al-
ternatives, including writ review in lieu of appeals in certain types of
cases or for certain issues, such as issues raised by postjudgment
motions.97 This paper does not purport to consider all such possi-
bilities. Instead the author will propose a strategy for discretionary
appeals in criminal and juvenile cases. The article will further
90. Kelso, supra note 2, at 447-48.
91. See id. at 444-45.
92. See id. at 448.
93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
94. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 445-47.
95. See id. at 446-47.
96. JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, supra note 1, at 171.
97. California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(b) provides that an
appeal may be taken from an order made after an appealable civil judgment.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1(b) (West Supp. 1998). These appeals in-
volve issues such as cost bills and attorney fees, matters that lend themselves
readily to writ review. California Penal Code section 1237 permits appeals
from "any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the
party." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237(b) (West Supp. 1998). These appeals typi-
cally involve sentencing issues, which likewise lend themselves to writ review.
See id. § 1237(a).
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attempt to demonstrate how adopting such a strategy, while preserv-
ing the due process and other constitutional rights of criminal and ju-
venile court litigants, can alleviate the workload problems of Cali-
fornia's intermediate appellate courts.
V. DISCRETIONARY APPEALS
A. The Requirement for Written Opinions and Oral Argument
Article VI, Section 14 of the California Constitution provides:
"Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine
causes shall be in writing with reasons stated."98 Each appeal is a
"cause. ' 99 Courts have interpreted the phrase "writing with reasons
stated" to require a full written opinion summarizing the relevant
facts and generally dealing with each issue the parties raise on ap-
peal. 100 Courts of appeal are therefore precluded from summarily
disposing of appeals, no matter how obviously without merit.' 0'
The California Supreme Court has held that parties to a "cause"
are also entitled to oral argument.102 At times, oral argument is ex-
tremely useful. Members of the court may have questions after
studying the briefs, and argument presents an opportunity for counsel
to answer such questions. If novel issues of law or novel applica-
tions of existing law are involved, oral argument permits counsel to
focus the discussion and assist the court's understanding. However,
98. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
99. See Funeral Dirs. Ass'n v. Board of Funeral Dirs., 22 Cal. 2d 104, 106,
136 P.2d 785, 786 (1943); Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams, 19 Cal. 2d 463,
468-69, 122 P.2d 257, 259-60 (1942).
100. See Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 32 Cal. 3d 867, 871, 654 P.2d
740, 742, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 559 (1982); People v. Brigham, 25 Cal. 3d 283,
285-86, 599 P.2d 100, 101-02, 157 Cal. Rptr. 905, 907 (1979).
101. Although the author has not exhaustively researched this issue in sister
states, the requirement for a full written opinion in all cases may be unique to
California jurisprudence.
102. See Moles, 32 Cal. 3d at 871, 654 P.2d at 742, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 559;
Brigham, 25 Cal. 3d at 285-86, 599 P.2d at 101-02, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 907-08;
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 4th 828, 831-
32, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899, 901-02 (1997). Oral argument may be waived. The
author is not aware of any published statistics but it is his experience that ar-
gument is waived in approximately 20% of civil cases and in approximately
half of all criminal and juvenile cases.
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in most instances oral argument adds little to the court's understand-
ing of the issues. Many lawyers merely repeat the arguments con-
tained in their briefs or insist upon reading a prepared statement that
should have been contained in their briefs. Although the author is
not aware of any studies concerning the amount of time spent by ap-
pellate judges preparing for and hearing oral argument, in his own
experience as an associate justice of the court of appeal, the time
probably amounts to 15% of the justices' workload, at least half of
which is unnecessary.
With respect to petitions for extraordinary writs, a different rule
applies. 103 A petition for such a writ does not create a "cause.
'1°4
Thus, the court may summarily dispose of such a petition without re-
quiring a response from the other party, without hearing oral argu-
ment, and without issuing an opinion. 105 In 1996-97, the appellate
courts received 8,879 such petitions; 10 6 during the same period, 849
such petitions were resolved by written opinion.0 7  Thus,
103. See Funeral Dirs. Ass', 22 Cal. 2d at 105-07, 136 P.2d at 786-87.
Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 and California Penal
Code section 1235, generally only judgments, postjudgment orders, and a lim-
ited number of specified trial court orders are appealable. See CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 904.1 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1235 (West
Supp. 1998). California procedure does not provide for interim appeals. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1. However, prejudgment orders issued by the
trial court are subject to discretionary review by way of petitions for writs of
prohibition or mandate. See id. In addition, the court hears petitions for writs
of habeas corpus, certiorari, and supersedeas. See id.
104. Cf. Funeral Dirs. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d at 106, 136 P.2d at 786 (finding a
court's initial action in issuing or declining to issue a prerogative writ on ex
parte application does not constitute the determination of a "cause").
105. See Countrywide, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 831-32, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901-
02. Once such an order to show cause or alternative writ issues, the matter is
fully briefed by the parties, oral argument is heard, and the court issues a writ-
ten opinion.
106. See 1998 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 20, at 24 tbl.4 col.(F).
107. See id. at 25 tbl.5 col.(F). The high rate of summary denial does not
necessarily reflect an equally high percentage of petitions that fail to raise
meritorious issues. Petitions for extraordinary writ are frequently denied on
the basis that the issues raised may be preserved for later review on appeal.
See Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 101 n.1, 243 Cal. Rptr.
536, 537 n.1 (1988); cf Omaha Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App.
3d 1266, 1273, 258 Cal. Rptr. 66, 69 (1989) (suggesting that a court of appeal
is in a "better position to review a question when called upon to do so in an
appeal instead of by way of a writ petition").
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW
approximately 90% of these petitions were denied without opinion.
During the same period, 13,061 appeals were fully briefed in the
courts of appeal, 10 8 and 13,928 appeals were resolved by written
opinion.1
0 9
The author is not aware of any studies indicating the amount of
judicial and staff attorney time devoted to the resolution of petitions
for extraordinary writs, as compared to appeals. However, the
author's experience would suggest the total amount of time devoted
to the resolution of such petitions represents no more than 10 to 15%
of the courts' workload.
B. Processing Appeals and Petitions for Extraordinary Writs
Procedures for the internal handling of appeals and petitions for
extraordinary writs undoubtedly vary between different divisions of
the California Court of Appeal. 10 However, the basic process is
probably fairly uniform. The author will therefore describe the pro-
cedures within his own division and chambers to demonstrate why
courts can resolve petitions for an extraordinary writ much more effi-
ciently than appeals, without sacrificing just results.
After an appeal is fully briefed, the justice who has been desig-
nated as the "author" receives the briefs and record. The two other
justices assigned as panelists on the case also receive copies of the
briefs. At that time, unless the parties have filed a waiver, the case is
108. See 1998 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 20, at 18 tbl.1 col.(D).
109. See id. at 25 tbl.5 col.(B).
110. Professor Kelso describes the process involved in an appeal:
[A]n appeal typically involves the following steps: (1) the trial court
clerk prepares a record from the lower court transcript; (2) counsel
prepare and file adversary briefs; (3) in an initial review, the appellate
court determines whether the appeal qualifies for special treatment
(e.g., settlement programs, decision without oral argument, denial of
review, or alternative disposition in discretionary appeals); (4) counsel
argue orally before a panel of three or more judges; (5) the appellate
court reaches a decision (which includes pre-argument analysis, a
post-argument conference, and collegial drafting of the opinion or
opinions); and (6) the appellate court publicly releases its opinion.
Kelso, supra note 2, at 457. By referring to "decisions without oral argument,
denial of review, or alternative disposition in discretionary appeals," Professor
Kelso obviously is referring to generic appellate courts. The California appel-
late courts do not have the authority to resolve cases on these bases.
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set for oral argument, approximately three months hence. The desig-
nated author reviews the briefs, often formulates tentative positions
and, in most instances, assigns the case to a staff attorney."' The
justice either discusses the case and his or her tentative positions with
the staff attorney or writes a memorandum to the attorney. The staff
attorney studies the briefs, reviews relevant portions of the record,
conducts legal research, and may in the course of this process confer
with the author. The staff attorney then prepares a summary.1 2 The
author reviews the summary and may refer back to the briefs, record,
and legal research as needed. Based on this review, the author may
make changes in the summary or direct the staff attorney to make
such revisions.
Approximately one week before oral argument," 3 the other two
justices on the panel receive copies of the summary. During the
week preceding the argument, each of the three justices reviews the
summary, the briefs, and the record as needed, and may review the
legal research. They may assign some of these tasks to an attorney
on their staff. During this period, the justices may confer informally
with the author or staff attorney concerning questions raised by the
summary. They may also indicate reservations or disagreement with
either the conclusions reached or the reasoning contained in the
summary. At times, changes are made to the summary based on
these discussions.
111. Most justices will select a few cases on which they do all or most of the
work themselves. However, the process in those cases is essentially the same
as described.
112. The "summary" contains a statement of the relevant facts, summarizes
and analyzes the arguments of the parties, reflects the staff attorney's own re-
search, and usually concludes with a specific recommendation. The summary
may point to issues that should be addressed at oral argument. Frequently, the
summary functions as a draft opinion.
113. Most, perhaps all, districts and divisions invite counsel to waive oral
argument. Oral argument is waived in a significant percentage of criminal and
a small percentage of civil appeals. See supra note 102. When oral argument
is waived, the internal procedure is simplified and the author and staff attorney
proceed immediately to the drafting of an opinion. Although a memorandum
will rarely first circulate among the panel members in an attempt to obtain the
views of the other panel members on a particular issue, generally no summary
is prepared in these cases.
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After oral argument, the justices on the panel discuss the case.
They may agree that the analysis and conclusions of the summary are
correct, negotiate changes, or infrequently, fail to reach a consensus.
Based on this discussion, the author then instructs the attorney who
prepared the summary to write an opinion. After the opinion is pre-
pared, the author reviews it and may make further changes. Upon
approval by the author, a staff member other than the staff attorney
who prepared the opinion again shepardizes all cited cases and veri-
fies quotations. When these tasks are completed, the author signs the
opinion and forwards it to one of the panel members. This panel
member in turn studies the opinion and, frequently, suggests changes
to the author. After the second panel member signs the opinion, it is
forwarded to the third panel member and the process is repeated. Fi-
nally, when all three have signed the opinion, it is filed.'
14
Although many of these steps may be abbreviated in the case of
an obviously meritless appeal, each step in this process is neverthe-
less required, including the preparation of a written opinion summa-
rizing the facts and addressing each issue raised. Such steps are not
necessary with petitions for extraordinary writs.115 Upon receipt of
such a petition, it is immediately assigned to a staff attorney who re-
views it and prepares a memorandum summarizing the facts and
contentions, together with an evaluation as to whether the petition is
potentially meritorious. These memoranda are distributed to the
three justices who have been designated as that month's "writ panel."
Each of them reviews the memoranda and, if necessary, all or por-
tions of the petition and accompanying record.
Once a week the writ panel meets with the writ attorneys to dis-
cuss the petitions. At the writ conference, the justices decide
114. When oral argument has been waived, the author and staff will not pre-
pare a summary but will immediately prepare a draft opinion. The other steps
in the process are essentially the same. After the court files the opinion, the
losing party will frequently file a petition for rehearing. Such petitions are
rarely granted but, based on the petition, amendments to the opinion may be
prepared.
115. It should be noted that, unlike most jurisdictions, California courts are
quite liberal in granting writ review from nonappealable interlocutory orders.
See DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES,
FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 70-74 (Michie Co. ed., 1994).
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whether the petitions are arguably meritorious. 116 If not, the presid-
ing or acting presiding justice signs an order denying the petition. If
the justices determine that the petition is arguably meritorious, they
issue an order requesting that the other party or parties file an infor-
mal letter response, usually within a matter of days. After receipt of
the letter response, the justices again discuss the petition at the writ
conference. If, after reviewing the informal response, they decide
that the petition is not arguably meritorious, they deny the petition by
issuing a simple order. On the other hand, if they decide that the pe-
tition may be meritorious, they order the parties to fully brief the is-
sues, 17 the matter is placed on the oral argument calendar," 8 and a
process identical to the preparation of an appeal, including the prepa-
ration of a summary and eventual opinion, takes place.
Appellants' opening briefs could be subjected to the same or a
similar procedure. Particularly in criminal and juvenile appeals, lack
of arguable merit is frequently obvious as soon as the opening brief is
read. Yet the prosecutor must file a respondent's brief, to which ap-
pellant usually files a reply. The court is then required to give "full
dress treatment" to the appeal, including oral argument and prepara-
tion of an opinion summarizing the relevant facts and explaining why
each of the issues raised in the appeal is without merit. A major in-
crease in the efficiency of the appellate courts would result if the
courts were permitted to treat the appellant's initial brief as a "Peti-
tion for Leave to Appeal," which could be denied summarily if it
failed to demonstrate arguable merit. In the next section, the author
116. Because a petition for extraordinary writ is an equitable procedure, the
petitioner must demonstrate that there is no adequate remedy at law. See gen-
erally Ross v. Board of Educ., 18 Cal. App. 222, 122 P. 967 (1912). Appeal is
generally an adequate remedy at law. See Brock v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d
629, 638, 177 P.2d 273, 278 (1947); McAneny v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. 6,
9, 87 P. 1020, 1021-22 (1906). A high proportion of petitions, though raising
arguably meritorious issues, fail to demonstrate that the issue cannot ultimately
be resolved on appeal and are therefore denied for failure to show an inade-
quate remedy at law.
117. This takes the form of either an order to show cause or an alternative
writ.
118. On occasion, the court will not hear oral arguments, and after receiving
the briefs, the court will issue a peremptory writ as authorized by Palma v.
U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 171, 178-80, 681 P.2d 893, 897-98,
203 Cal. Rptr. 626, 630-31 (1984).
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will propose a less drastic change which could nevertheless increase
appellate court efficiency.
C. The Certificate of Probable Cause
Since 1965, California Penal Code section 1237.5119 has re-
quired that a defendant wishing to appeal from a plea of guilty or
admission of a probation violation obtain a "certificate of probable
cause" from the trial court.120 This requirement was an obvious re-
sponse to frivolous appeals following guilty pleas. The procedure
prescribed by the code requires a defendant to "file[] with the trial
court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of peujury
showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds
going to the legality of the proceedings."' 121 Based on this statement,
the trial court determines whether there is probable cause for a meri-
torious appeal. Absent such a certificate, no appeal is permitted.
This procedure was held to be constitutional. 22 There is no require-
ment for such a certificate of probable cause when a defendant is
convicted after a trial.
The "probable cause" requirement for the issuance of the certifi-
cate does not mean that the trial court must conclude that its own de-
cision is probably reversible. 123 As noted in People v. Ribero,
12 4
"[s]ince the trial court cannot properly be put in the position of
commenting adversely on its own rulings, the Legislature could not
have intended such a meaning. Rather the test that must have been
intended to apply is whether the appeal is clearly frivolous and vexa-
tious or whether it involves an honest difference of opinion."'125 In
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5 (West Supp. 1998).
120. There are exceptions to the requirement and it does not apply to pre-
plea search and seizure issues or to any issues which arise post-plea. See Peo-
ple v. Panizzon, 13 Cal. 4th 68, 74-75, 913 P.2d 1061, 1064-65, 51 Cal. Rptr.
2d 851, 855-56 (1996).
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5(a) (West Supp. 1998).
122. See People v. Davis, 255 Cal. App. 2d 907, 909, 64 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2-3
(1967).
123. See People v. Ribero, 4 Cal. 3d 55, 63 n.4, 480 P.2d 308, 313 n.4, 92
Cal. Rptr. 692, 697 n.4 (1971).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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People v. Holland,126 the California Supreme Court noted that the
only basis for denial of the certificate is a determination that there is
"no possible legal basis" for the appeal, 2 7 and the trial court must is-
sue the certificate whenever the appeal is "arguably meritorious."'
128
When a defendant has demonstrated the existence of a non-
frivolous issue, a denial of the certificate constitutes an abuse of dis-
cretion.'2 9 In the face of such a denial, a defendant may petition the
court of appeal for a writ of mandate. 30 Thus, a defendant can ob-
tain appellate review. Yet, it is only in those cases where the appel-
late court disagrees with the trial court and determines that a defen-
dant presents an "arguably meritorious" issue that the appellate court
is required to invest its resources in a full-blown appeal, complete
with oral argument and a detailed written opinion. If the appellate
court agrees that the issue raised is not "arguably meritorious," it
merely denies the petition with a simple order to that effect.
The California Supreme Court has limited the effectiveness of
section 1237.5131 by holding that, once the trial court certifies an is-
sue as "arguably meritorious," an appellant may raise additional is-
sues in the court of appeal. 132 The language of the statute permits
such an interpretation; it merely provides that "[n]o appeal shall be
taken... from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, or a revocation of probation following an admission of
violation,"' 133 in the absence of the certificate, and does not limit the
issues that may be raised upon such an appeal.' 34 For the statute to
fully accomplish its purposes, the author recommends adopting an
amendment limiting the issues on appeal to those certified by the trial
126. 23 Cal. 3d 77, 588 P.2d 765, 151 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1978).
127. Id. at 84, 588 P.2d at 768, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
128. Id. "It is not the trial court's responsibility to determine if there was an
error in the proceedings. The trial court's sole objective is to eliminate those
appeals 'having no possible legal basis' by refusing to issue a certificate of
probable cause." Id. "
129. See id.
130. See In re Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 679, 683, 511 P.2d 1153, 1155, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 801, 803 (1973).
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5 (West Supp. 1998).
132. See People v. Hoffard, 10 Cal. 4th 1170, 1178, 899 P.2d 896, 900, 43
Cal. Rptr. 2d 827, 831 (1995).
133. CAL. PENALCODE § 1237.5.
134. See id.
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judge as "arguably meritorious." Again, where the trial judge certi-
fies one issue but refuses to certify another issue, a defendant should
be permitted to seek appellate review of the denial by way of a peti-
tion for writ of mandate.
135
California courts have held that the requirement for the certifi-
cate of probable cause does not apply to orders made following the
plea,136 because the statute applies only to "a judgment of conviction
upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation of probation
following an admission of violation."'137 Such issues frequently in-
volve contentions concerning the propriety of the sentence imposed.
Extending the certificate requirement to such post-plea issues would
be particularly useful. If the trial court fails to recognize an arguable
issue with respect to such a contention, writ review can readily re-
solve the issue in most instances. The trial court itself is in the best
position to correct sentencing errors.
It is further the author's opinion that defendants should be re-
quired to obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court
before being permitted to file any appeal in a criminal or juvenile
proceeding. This requirement should be conditioned upon the trial
court finding the issue raised to be "arguably meritorious" and be
combined with writ review from the denial of such a certificate. 138
This would permit the appellate courts to resolve criminal appeals
expeditiously while still safeguarding the parties' rights.
135. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
136. See People v. Lloyd, 17 Cal. 4th 658, 666, 951 P.2d 1191, 1195, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 228 (1998); People v. Cotton, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 1079,
284 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 (1991). The recently decided People v. Lloyd contains
an interesting dissent by Justice Brown wherein she complains that "[f]or the
past 30 years, we have suffered with the consequences, struggling repeatedly -
and unsuccessfully - to articulate the scope of the certificate of probable cause
requirement, now riddled with ill-defined exceptions and exceptions to excep-
tions." People v. Lloyd, 17 Cal. 4th at 667, 951 P.2d at 1196-97, 72 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 229-30 (Brown, J., dissenting).
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5.
138. Then Senior Assistant Attorney General Vance Raye, now an Associate
Justice of the California Court of Appeal, suggested a similar procedure, with-
out reference to writ review, during the 1981 hearing of the Assembly Judici-
ary and Criminal Justice Committees. See Court of Appeal Efficiency, supra
note 37, at 47-49 (statement of Vance Raye, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral).
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California Penal Code section 1237.5 should be amended to
make the issuance of a certificate of probable cause a condition
precedent for the filing of an appeal, not only, as now, where the de-
fendant has pleaded guilty or admitted to a probation violation, 39 but
also after trial. Such a certificate should be issued when the trial
court determines a defendant has an arguable position on appeal with
respect to specific issues to be identified in the certificate. Upon the
issuance of such a certificate, a defendant would proceed with an ap-
peal under the present procedures, limited to those issues identified
in the certificate. The amendment should further provide that, upon
denial of such a certificate, or upon the refusal of the trial court to
designate specified issues, a defendant may petition the appellate
court for leave to appeal or to add issues to the appeal.
The standard for the grant of such petitions should be whether a
defendant has an arguable position with respect to the issues sought
to be raised on appeal; if so, the petition should be granted and the
defendant would proceed with an appeal under the present proce-
dures, except the defendant's petition would serve as appellant's
opening brief. If the appellate court considered it appropriate, it
could invite the Attorney General to file an informal response before
deciding whether to grant the petition. The proposed procedure
should provide sufficient time to permit defendant's trial counsel to
confer with appellate counsel, and to prepare those portions of the re-
cord relevant to issues identified in the petition for leave to appeal.
140
In addition, it should be emphasized that the proposed standard
for the issuance of a certificate of probable cause and the grant of a
petition for leave to appeal differ significantly from the standard for
both the grant of petitions for review in the California Supreme
Court14 ' and for the grant of petitions for certiorari in the United
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5.
140. As such petitions will be issue-specific, records may not need to be as
extensive as they now are, thus saving the costs associated with the preparation
of a complete record in each case. Additional savings will be realized in that
the attorney general will only need to prepare briefs in those cases where the
court determines there are arguable issues on appeal. As long ago as 1981, the
Attorney General estimated its costs for the preparation of respondent's briefs
averaged more than $2,000 per case. See Court of Appeal Efficiency, supra
note 37, at 45.
141. See CAL. CT. R. 29.
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States Supreme Court. 142 Applicants for certificates of probable
cause and petitioners for leave to appeal would not have to demon-
strate the importance of the question or the probable success of their
appeal, but merely that the issue or issues proposed are "arguably
meritorious."
D. Proposed Amended Statute
The author proposes Penal Code section 1237.5 be amended to
read as follows:
§ 1237.5 APPEAL BY DEFENDANT UPON JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION OR REVOCATION OF PROBATION.
(a) No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a
judgment of conviction or any post-conviction order of the
court, including a revocation of probation, unless either:
(1) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of
probable cause for such appeal with the county clerk; or
(2) The court of appeal has granted defendant's petition
for leave to appeal.
(b) The trial court shall issue a certificate of probable
cause when the following conditions have been met:
(1) the defendant has filed, in the trial court, a statement,
executed by both defendant and his or her attorney, under
oath or penalty of perjury, identifying specific issues and
showing with respect to such issues reasonable grounds
justifying an appeal, and
(2) the trial court has determined that any issue or issues
so identified is or are arguably meritorious.
(c) The certificate of probable cause shall identify those
issues that the court has determined to be arguably merito-
rious.
(d) The court of appeal shall grant a petition for leave to
appeal when it determines that any issue or issues identified
by defendant is or are arguably meritorious.
(1) Such a petition shall be executed by counsel, except as
provided in subsection (f) hereof.
142. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
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(2) The order granting the petition shall identify those is-
sues that the court of appeal has determined to be arguably
meritorious.
(e) No petition for leave to appeal may be filed in the
court of appeal unless defendant has first filed a statement
in the trial court requesting that court to execute and file a
certificate of probable cause with respect to the same issue
or issues raised in the petition for leave to appeal.
(f) Counsel's execution of the statement requesting issu-
ance of a certificate of probable cause and counsel's execu-
tion of the petition for leave to appeal shall constitute coun-
sel's certification that the specified issues are arguably
meritorious. If a defendant wishes to assert issues that his
or her counsel does not deem arguably meritorious, the por-
tion of the statement or petition dealing with those issues
shall be executed solely by defendant.
(g) The appeal shall be limited to those issues as to which
either the trial court has filed a certificate of probable cause
or the court of appeal has granted leave to appeal.
(h) The Judicial Council shall issue such rules as are nec-
essary to implement this section.
(1) Such rules shall provide for the appointment of ap-
pellate counsel to assist indigent defendants in the prepara-
tion of the statement requesting issuance of the certificate of
probable cause or the petition for leave to appeal and allow
time for the preparation of a record, if needed in the prepa-
ration of the statement.
(2) Such rules shall also provide that a petition for leave
to appeal may be deemed to be appellant's opening brief if
the petition is granted.
A similar statute should be enacted in the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code to govern appeals in juvenile cases.
E. Constitutional Issues
California Constitution, Article VI, Section 11 provides that the
"courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when superior courts
have original jurisdiction and in other causes prescribed by
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statute." 143 Because the criminal and juvenile cases which are the
subject of this paper all originate in superior court, we must consider
whether the proposal here presented requires an amendment to the
California Constitution or whether the proposed statutory change
would be sufficient.
In People ex rel. Davidson v. Perry,144 the California Supreme
Court noted, well over 100 years ago, that the legislature did not have
the power to abridge the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the
appellate court. 145 Thirty five years later, in In re Sutter-Butte By-
Pass Assessment,146 the Court reiterated this position. 147 Then Arti-
cle VI, section 4 of the California Constitution provided inter alia for
appellate jurisdiction "on appeal from the superior courts ... in all
cases at law which involve the... legality of any tax,... assessment,
etc ....... 148 An act of the legislature, which authorized the issuance
of bonds by a drainage district, provided for review by a three-judge
panel in the superior court and specified "no appeal from the judg-
ment given and made by said court shall be had."' 149 The court held:
"[T]he legislature cannot by the creation of a new remedy deprive
this court of its constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction. ..."150
It has thus long been settled that a statute may not deprive the appel-
late courts of their power of review.
However, this does not answer the question. Writ review is also
appellate review, ls ' but is it a constitutionally valid substitute for a
"full dress" appeal? The California Supreme Court recently ad-
dressed this issue in Powers v. City of Richmond.5 2 There, the court
was confronted with a statute providing that actions under the Public
143. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
144. 79 Cal. 105, 21 P. 423 (1889).
145. See id. at 108, 21 P. at 424. The facts of Perry bear an interesting re-
semblance to the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case of Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
146. 190 Cal. 532, 213 P. 974 (1923).
147. See id. at 536-37, 213 P. at 975-76.
148. Id. at 536, 213 P. at 975 (citing CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4).
149. Id. at 535 (citing Act of May 27, 1919, ch. 520, § 8, 1919 Cal. Stats.).
150. Id. at 537, 213 P. at 976.
151. Appellate jurisdiction includes review by writ. See Ex parte Watkins,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 572 (1833).
152. 10 Cal. 4th 85, 893 P.2d 1160, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839 (1995).
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Records Act,153 though tried in superior court, are not appealable but
instead are "immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court
for the issuance of an extraordinary writ.'
154
Although the Powers Court upheld the provision in a 5-2 opin-
ion, no majority agreed on the basic issue of whether the constitu-
tional right to an appeal was satisfied by a provision for writ re-
view.155 Appellants contended that the "constitutional right of appeal
necessarily includes the rights to oral argument, a decision on the
merits, and a written opinion explaining the basis of the appellate
court's decision." 156 Justice Kennard, who wrote the lead opinion,
joined by Justices Baxter and Werdegar, disagreed and opined that
.the statute did not violate the "appellate jurisdiction" provision of
Article VI, Section 11.157 She noted that the constitutional provision
"serves to establish and allocate judicial authority, not to define or
guarantee the rights of litigants. Indeed, the provision nowhere men-
tions direct appeals or a 'right of appeal."",158 She defined constitu-
tionally conferred appellate jurisdiction broadly to include writ re-
view.
159
In his concurring opinion, Justice George, joined by Justice Ara-
bian, agreed that, with respect to "claims brought under the Califor-
nia Public Records Act," the statute was constitutional. 60 The con-
currence based its conclusion on the time sensitive nature of claims
under the Act and the fact that, if normal appellate procedures were
followed, the resulting delays would largely frustrate the Act's pur-
poses. 6 1 Thus, while recognizing that "the state Constitution gener-
ally has not been interpreted to require that appellate review of a
153. See CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 6250-6259 (West 1995).
154. Id. § 6259(c).
155. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 91, 893 P.2d at 1162, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 841.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 92, 893 P.2d at 1163, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842.
158. Id. at 91, 893 P.2d at 1162, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 841.
159. See id. at 92, 893 P.2d at 1163, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842.
160. Id. at 115, 893 P.2d at 1178, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857 (George, J., con-
curring).
161. See id. at 117-18, 893 P.2d at 1179, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858 (George, J.,
concurring).
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superior court decision invariably proceed by direct appeal,"' 162 Jus-
tice George was careful to note a danger inherent in following the
lead opinion to its logical conclusion:
[T]he lead opinion's reasoning very well could be under-
stood to permit the Legislature totally to transform the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal from an appellate tribunal whose
duties generally involve the resolution of cases in which
litigants have a direct appeal 'as a matter of right'-and in
which most decisions must be renderedin writing with rea-
sons stated' (CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14)-into an appellate
court whose jurisdiction consists entirely of writ review and
as to which the court has no obligation to resolve any of the
cases before it by a written decision setting forth the reasons
for its ruling .... I believe there is ample reason for this
court to be extremely cautious before embracing an inter-
pretation of the pertinent state constitutional provision that
would permit such a major revision of the state's appellate
process to be made by the Legislature.
163
Justice Lucas' dissent, joined by Justice Mosk, after an exhaus-
tive review of the history of the relevant constitutional provisions,
concluded that Article VI, section 11 provides litigants a right to a
full appeal from all judgments of the superior court. 164 These jus-
tices would accept the writ review without precluding the dissatisfied
party from subsequently filing an appeal if the writ review were
summarily denied.1
65
The California Supreme Court has another pending case dealing
with the same issue. It has granted a petition for review in Leone v.
Division of Medical Quality.166 There the court of appeal dealt with
162. Id. at 123, 893 P.2d at 1183, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862 (George, J., con-
curring).
163. Id. at 116, 893 P.2d at 1178-79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857-58 (George, J.,
concurring).
164. See id. at 174, 893 P.2d at 1218, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897 (Lucas, J., dis-
senting).
165. See id. at 183, 893 P.2d at 1224, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903 (Lucas, J., dis-
senting).
166. 57 Cal. App. 4th 1240, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689 (1997) (review granted
Dec. 23, 1997). Under California procedure, once review is granted, the
opinion of the court of appeal no longer has precedential value and will not be
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a new statutory scheme dealing with physician discipline. 167 When
the Division of Medical Quality of the Medical Board of California
imposes such discipline, the physician can challenge the determina-
tion by filing a petition for mandamus in the superior court.168 Until
1996, the denial of such a petition was subject to an appeal to the
court of appeal. In order to expedite the process, the legislature pro-
vided, effective January 1, 1996, that such review will be solely by
way of a writ petition.169 In Leone, the Appellate Court held that the
statute violated the right of appeal granted by Article VI, Sec-
tion 11.170 The California Supreme Court granted a hearing. 17 1 Even
under Justice George's view, as expressed in his concurring opinion
in Powers v. City of Richmond,172 a plurality of the court may well
uphold the statute in view of the need for speedy resolution. 173 How-
ever, in light of the change of personnel since Powers was decided,
the case may also clarify the court's view with respect to changes
such as those proposed in this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
The portion of the report of the Commission on the Future of the
California Courts, Justice in the Balance 2020, dealing with the in-
termediate appellate courts, paints far too rosy a picture of the future
facing these courts. The report makes unwarranted assumptions
about changes in the legal culture and fails to recognize that its pre-
dictions of decreasing appeals, at least insofar as they pertain to
criminal and juvenile cases, lack a factual basis. The reality is that
unless drastic changes are made in appellate procedures, California's
Court of Appeal will be overwhelmed by an ever-increasing number
of appeals.
included in the permanent reports. See CAL. CT. R. 976(d); Quintano v. Mer-
cury Casualty Co., 11 Cal. 4th 1049, 1067, n.6, 906 P.2d 1057, 1068, n.6, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 12, n.6 (1995).
167. See Leone, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 1240-41, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689-90.
168. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1998).
169. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2337 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
170. See Leone, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 1295, 67 Cal Rptr. 2d at 694.
171. See No. S065485, California Supreme Court Minutes 5 (Dec. 23, 1997)
in 4 California Official Reports (Feb. 3, 1998 Advance Sheets).
172. 10 Cal. 4th 85, 893 P.2d 1160, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839 (1995).
173. See id. at 115-24, 893 P.2d at 1178-84, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857-63
(George, J., concurring); supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
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There are two primary conditions driving the increasing work-
load of the appellate courts: the impossibility of devising disincen-
tives to meritless criminal and juvenile appeals and the requirement
that the court give "full dress treatment" to all appeals, regardless of
their merit, including hearing oral argument and writing a complete
opinion citing relevant facts and addressing each issue raised in the
appeal. Although some other strategies considered by the Commis-
sion may tend to alleviate the upcoming "crisis of volume" in Cali-
fornia's appellate courts, none of them will have the dramatic impact
required to enable these courts to continue to fulfill their functions.
A number of proposed strategies beyond the scope of this paper
should be considered. These include, for example, using appellate
commissioners, review by petition for extraordinary writ in lieu of
appeal in certain classes of cases, transferring appellate review of
certain classes of cases to the appellate departments of the superior
court, and awarding attorneys' fees to successful appellants in civil
cases.
The volume of criminal and juvenile appeals, which represent a
large share of the work of the appellate courts, can be decreased sig-
nificantly if procedures are adopted to permit meritless criminal and
juvenile appeals to be resolved without the requirement for oral ar-
gument and detailed opinions in such cases. One strategy that would
aid in the reduction of such meritless appeals is to permit the appel-
late court to deny the appeal summarily upon review of appellant's
opening brief. A less drastic strategy is an expansion of the "certifi-
cate of probable cause" procedure of California Penal Code sec-
tion 1237.5.174 That statute now requires that, before an appeal may
be taken from a judgment of conviction following a guilty plea, the
trial judge certify that there are nonfrivolous grounds for an ap-
peal. 175 Denial of the certificate is reviewable in the appellate court
by way of an efficient writ proceeding. 176 The author recommends
amending the statute to apply to all criminal and juvenile appeals, a
change that would reduce the workload of California's intermediate
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5 (West Supp. 1998).
175. See id.
176. See People v. Holland, 23 Cal. 3d 77, 84-85, 588 P.2d 765, 768-69, 151
Cal. Rptr. 625, 628-29 (1978); see also In re Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 679, 683, 511
P.2d 1153, 1155, 108 Cal. Rptr. 801, 803 (1973).
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appellate courts. The proposed amendment to section 1237.5 would
have the following characteristics:
e The right to appeal in criminal and juvenile cases would be
conditioned upon the trial court issuing a "certificate of probable
cause."
9 The certificate would specify the issues which are "arguably
meritorious" on appeal.
" The appeal would be limited to the issues so specified.
" Denial of the certificate or denial to certify a specific issue
would be reviewable by petition for leave to appeal in the appellate
court, using the same "arguably meritorious" standard.
e Upon denial of the petition for leave to appeal, the appellate
court would neither be required to hear oral argument nor to issue an
opinion.
e Upon issuance of a certificate of probable cause or upon grant
of the petition for leave to appeal, the appeal would go forward under
present procedures, including oral argument and a full written opin-
ion, limited to the issues identified in the certificate or the order
granting leave to appeal.
a Procedures should include a provision for the appointment of
appellate counsel and the preparation of a record in connection with
the proposed procedures.
It is unclear at this time whether the procedural changes pro-
posed may be accomplished by means of a statutory amendment or
whether such a change would also require an amendment to Califor-
nia's Constitution. A case now pending in the California Supreme
Court may answer this question.
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